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ACCOMMODATING EMERGENCIES
Eric A. Posner* & Adrian Vermeule**
I.

Two Views

There are two main views about the proper role of the Constitution during
national emergencies. We label them the “accommodation” view and the “strict” view.
The accommodation view is that the Constitution should be relaxed or suspended during
an emergency. During an emergency, it is important that power be concentrated. Power
should move up from the states to the federal government, and, within the federal
government, from the legislature and the judiciary to the executive. Constitutional rights
should be relaxed, so that the executive can move forcefully against the threat. If dissent
weakens resolve, then dissent should be curtailed. If domestic security is at risk, then
intrusive searches should be tolerated. There is no reason to think that the constitutional
rights and powers appropriate for an emergency are the same as those that prevail during
times of normalcy. The reason for relaxing constitutional norms during emergencies is
that the risks inherent in expansive executive power—the misuse of the power for
political gain—are justified by the national security benefits.
Many constitutions have had provisions that enhance executive powers during
times of emergency. The most famous example is also the most unfortunate: the Weimar
Constitution’s provision granting dictatorial powers to the executive in case of
emergency.1 But this is just one example among many.2 In American constitutional law
article 1, section 9, of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to suspend the privilege
of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”3 Although this emergency power was pointedly vested in the legislative branch rather
than the executive,4 a more important constitutional rule is implicit but widely
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recognized: during most major wars involving the United States, Congress and the
judiciary have deferred to the executive more than they have during peacetime.5
The view that the Constitution accommodates, or should accommodate, special
restrictions on civil liberties during emergencies comes in three flavors. One is that the
Constitution itself provides, implicitly or explicitly, for greater executive power during
emergencies, and that this is widely understood and accepted. Another is that the
expansion of executive power is accepted but not explicitly acknowledged, and courts
(for example) do and should exercise deference surreptitiously, by ducking legal
challenges with the help of the copious procedural mechanisms at their disposal—
standing doctrine, denial of certiorari, delay, and so forth. Bickel’s passive virtues6
expand during emergencies. A third is that the Constitution does not, explicitly or
implicitly, expand executive powers during emergencies but that government officials do,
and should, violate the Constitution when justified by emergency conditions. These
variants are of little interest: the second is a version of the debate on judicial candor, an
issue that is orthogonal to the question of emergency powers. As for the third argument, it
is always open to a public official to argue that obeying or enforcing the law is immoral,
and such an official may or may not succeed in persuading the public or other officials
who have the electoral or legal discretion to excuse him from liability. This phenomenon
is not particular to emergency.7 For these reasons, we will henceforth refer to the
accommodation view generally and not distinguish among its variants.
The second major view about emergencies is that constitutional rules are not, and
should not be, relaxed during an emergency. This view starts from the observation that
the Constitution already provides that the level of protection for civil liberties depends on
the interest of the government. Consider, for example, “compelling interest” standards
use to evaluate laws that discriminate against protected classes. When an emergency
exists, the government has a “compelling interest” in responding to it in a vigorous and
effective way. Thus, laws that would not be tolerated during non-emergencies are
constitutionally permissible during emergencies. Racial or ethnic profiling, for example,
is likely to be seen as less objectionable when used to prevent a terrorist attack than when
used to interdict the distribution of illegal drugs. The Constitution should be enforced
“strictly”—that is, the rules should be the same during emergencies as during nonemergencies, even if outcomes differ—so that both civil liberties and government
interests such as national security can be appropriately balanced, as they always need to
be.
As a practical matter, the difference between the two views will be reflected in the
aggressiveness of the courts. Under the first view, the courts will defer to emergency
policy once they determine that an emergency exists. The courts do not demand that the
government justify emergency measures by showing that they serve a compelling
interest. Under the second view, courts may permit many emergency measures, but only
5
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after subjecting them to review, and courts are likely to strike down many emergency
measures as well. The first view has generally been adopted by American courts during
emergencies; the second view is the favored position among civil libertarians and law
professors.
For completeness, we should mention a variant of the second view, which holds
that not only rules but outcomes should remain the same during emergencies and nonemergencies. On this view, emergency measures are permissible only if they would be
permissible if taken during non-emergencies. Racial profiling, for example, if not
permitted for drug interdiction, is also not permissible for deterring terrorism. Although
we do not know of anyone who clearly endorses this view, it approximates the position of
those who are most hostile to the Bush administration’s post-9/11 antiterrorism policies.8
Defenders of accommodation argue that rules that are appropriate during normal
times are not appropriate for emergencies. Judges are not capable of evaluating the
actions of the executive and therefore should defer to its judgment rather than subject
emergency policies to constitutional review. National security is a preeminent value, far
more important than crime control, and when national security is at stake, vigorous action
is needed, and the public has no choice other than to put its trust in the executive. The
underlying calculus is that the costs of temporary dictatorship (including the risk that it
will become permanent) and suppression of civil liberties are less than cost of national
destruction.
Defenders of the strict enforcement view might deny that this calculus is correct.
They might argue national security is not that important, that the loss of civil liberties is
more important than the accommodators think, or that the executive invariably discounts
civil liberties and exaggerates national security. But this argument is a dead end. There is
no reason to think that judges are more likely to make the right tradeoff between security
and civil liberties than the executive is; nor is there any reason to think that the
constitutional rules that evolve during peacetime reflect the appropriate tradeoffs during
emergencies. The fact that the executive’s hands are on the levers of power is a sufficient
reason for vesting him with the authority to make this tradeoff rather than deferring to
peacetime constitutional rules developed by the courts.
Defenders of the strict enforcement view have proposed two other rationales for
their position. These rationales provide two special reasons for thinking that executives,
whether acting on their own or in response to public demand, will typically put too much
weight on security, and not enough on civil liberties.
One rationale for strict enforcement during emergencies is institutional. The
argument is that emergencies work like a ratchet: with every emergency, constitutional
protections are reduced, and after the emergency is over enhancement of constitutional
powers is either maintained, or not fully eliminated, so that the executive ends up with
more power after the emergency than it had before the emergency. With each successive
emergency, the executive’s power is ratcheted up. Or, to change the figure, the
Constitution loses some of its spring every time it is pushed out of shape.
8
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The other rationale is psychological: during an emergency, people panic, and
when they panic they support policies that are unwise and excessive.9 Relaxation of
constitutional protections would give free rein to the panicked reaction, when what is
needed is constraint. Normal constitutional protections hinder the enactment of bad laws
during emergencies. To the critic who argues that normal constitutional protections also
prevent needed concentration of power in the executive, the defender of strict
enforcement argues that any hindrances on forceful executive action would be justified
by the benefits, the avoided laws and acts that reflect fear rather than reason.
The ratchet theory and the panic theory have become fixed points in the debate
about emergency powers, yet have escaped rigorous analysis. As we will show, both
theories have conceptual, normative, and empirical difficulties. The ratchet theory lacks a
mechanism that permits constitutional powers to rise and prevents them from falling, and
makes implausible assumptions about the rationality of individuals who consent to
constitutional changes during emergencies. Those who fear the ratchet’s power point to
constitutional trends—such as the rise of executive power—that are the result of longterm technological and demographic changes, not of recurrent emergencies; and they
ignore the possibility of constitutional trends in the opposite direction, such as the rise of
individual rights. (If there is such a trend, it is not a ratchet process either; we include a
critique of an optimistic variant of the emergency ratchet, in which a succession of
emergencies causes government to display ever-increasing respect for civil liberties). As
for the panic theory, it assumes that people can, while panicked, get outside themselves
and constrain their own fear. Although people and officials panic, we have found little
evidence that constitutions or other laws or institutions can control the panic, and cause
people to lose their fear, or else choose, while panicked, laws that they would choose if
they were not panicked. Finally, defenders of either theory do not examine their
normative premises sufficiently: it is not clear that panics and ratchets, if they occur, are
bad things. Fear is often the correct response to a threat; panics can shatter constitutional
structures, but sometimes constitutional structures should be shattered. Ratchets put the
status quo out of reach, but sometimes that is where it should be.
II. Ratchets
In this Part we critique accounts of emergency that posit a ratchet effect, in which
a succession of emergencies produce a unidirectional, and irreversible, increase in some
legal or political variable. Section A provides a brief overview of ratchet accounts in
legal theory, questioning their general utility. Section B critiques the most common
version of the emergency ratchet account, which holds that emergencies produce a statist
ratchet: an irreversible trend towards increased state power and official suppression of
civil liberties, free speech and political association. We suggest that the statist ratchet
account is untenable on conceptual, institutional, psychological and normative grounds.
Section C critiques a mirror-image account, which holds that emergencies produce a
9
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libertarian ratchet in the form of ever-increasing governmental respect for civil liberties.
Section D suggests that the ratchet idea has little utility for positive or normative
argument about emergencies, principally because ratchet accounts posit an implausible
amount of friction in the lawmaking system. In our picture, by contrast, the lawmaking
system adjusts fluidly, if unpredictably, to emergencies, exogenous shocks, and other
changes in the political and social environment; few changes are unidirectional and
irreversible in the strong sense that ratchet accounts suppose.
A. Ratchets, in general
The “ratchet” (or, redundantly, the “one-way ratchet”) is a favored analytic tool of
legal theorists. Too much so, in fact. Ratchet accounts are invoked in a bewildering array
of settings, ranging from government contracting10 and the theory of regulation and
bureaucratic behavior11 to racial profiling12 and sexual mores.13 For a genuine ratchet to
occur, however, highly specialized conditions must obtain. The essential features of a
ratchet are unidirectional and irreversible change in some legal variable. First, the policy
space in which the ratchet occurs is assumed to be one-dimensional, so that the ratchet
produces ever-increasing values of a variable—more and more and more of something.
Second, the incremental increases are fixed once they occur. At Time 1, some legal rule
or practice emerges endogenously from political processes, including the legal system; at
Time 2, the rule or practice is cemented by some mechanism, and has become an
exogenous constraint; at Time 3 some dimension of the rule increases endogenously; at
Time 4 the increase is cemented into place; and the process repeats indefinitely. These
conditions are rare, perhaps even nonexistent. The danger here is that the “ratchet” label
is being bandied about too freely, and is often confused with a simple trend that happens
to extend over time, or with endogenous but reversible change in some variable that
would quickly revert to its original value if other legal or social conditions changed.
Despite the ubiquity of ratchet accounts, few such accounts are fully specified,
and often there is no plausible way to cash them out. Take a popular idea, or intuition, in
constitutional theory: if conservative judges respect precedent while liberal judges freely
overrule precedents, and conservative courts alternate with liberal ones, then a ratchet
effect is created, whereby the existing stock of precedents becomes increasingly liberal
over time. But this account is either out of equilibrium, or arbitrarily assumes that the two
camps have wildly disparate preferences. If the implicit picture is that both liberal and
conservative judges are political, seeking to embody their preferences and attitudes in
legal decisions, then conservative judges are myopic in refusing to overrule liberal
decisions; they are repeatedly, and inexplicably, duped by the equally unprincipled but
more cunning liberals. So the picture must instead be that liberal judges are political
10
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while conservative judges have a strong and principled preference for adhering to any
past decision, whatever its political valence; but this seems arbitrary.
Perhaps history contains a few genuine ratchet processes. The continual, and
doubtless irreversible, expansion of the political franchise in liberal democracies over the
course of the 19th and 20th centuries might qualify. But even here there are problems;
although it seems intuitive that voting rights, once granted, are difficult to revoke
(assuming the recently-enfranchised may themselves vote on any revocation proposal), it
is not obvious why enfranchised groups would continually admit politically powerless
groups into the political system. In general, ratchet arguments are methodologically
suspect, and are invoked with far greater frequency than is warranted by theory or
evidence. This pattern holds true for ratchet arguments about emergency powers, to
which we now turn.
B. The statist ratchet
The statist ratchet identifies a putative tendency of emergency policies to
“become entrenched over time and thus normalized and made routine. . . . The
maintenance of emergency powers may be accompanied by expansion over time of the
scope of such powers. At the same time, built-in limitations on the exercise of emergency
authority and powers tend to wither away.”14
As it turns out, however, the statist ratchet account has only a surface sheen of
plausibility, and no core. It assumes that emergencies produce unidirectional and
irreversible change in the direction of official intrusion on civil liberties. But there is no
obvious reason to think that any such process occurs; the statist ratchet fails to supply a
mechanism that would explain such a process if it did occur; and if there is such a
mechanism, it is not clear that the resulting ratchet process is bad. We will organize these
points into four critiques of the statist ratchet: conceptual, institutional, psychological,
and normative.
1. Conceptual problems
The statist ratchet, like all ratchet accounts, assumes a finite, one-dimensional
policy space. In this space, government policies vary from minimally to maximally
intrusive; the statist ratchet assumes that emergencies produce a continual increase that is
unidirectional on this dimension, moving steadily from less official oppression to more.
But this picture is far too crude. The policy space is not one-dimensional but
multi-dimensional: official policies, whether instituted during an emergency or not, can
intrude more (or less) on some margins while intruding less (or more) on others. At time
T the government policy for airport security is to search passengers who fit a given ethnic
and religious profile. At Time T+1 the policy changes to random searches; the new
policy, let us say, imposes a cost (at least in an expected sense) on a greater number of
people, but reduces the stigma of being searched. Here it is senseless to ask whether
liberty been increased or decreased; instead it has been redistributed, by imposing a
smaller deprivation more widely. Second, there is the standard problem of conflicts or
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tensions between and among libertarian rights, arising from budget constraints on the
government that funds the institutions needed to protect those rights. More money for
airport searches may reduce the need for ethnic profiling, but it may mean less money for
public defenders, or a longer court queue for citizens asserting constitutional liberties
against government.
These two problems—controversial choices about the distributive profile of
libertarian rights, and the interdependence of budgeting choices that affect rights—mean
that officials face the difficult problem of aggregating incompatible liberties across
different individuals. In rare cases, Pareto-improving moves will enable greater security
at a given level of official intrusion, or less intrusion with a constant level of security;15
but in most cases more liberty for some means less liberty for others. Because
aggregative judgments are inescapable, it is not so much wrong as incoherent to speak
generally of “society” having “more” or “less” liberty. The simplistic picture of
unidimensional, unidirectional change embodied in the statist ratchet does not begin to
engage these problems.
Finally, the boundaries of the policy space themselves change over time.
Exogenous shocks arising from technological, economic and social change can transform
the policy arenas in which the balance between security and liberty is played out.
Governments that had managed to assert some level of control over traditional media
must cope with the arrival of the Internet; by the time the law surrounding cross-border
policing has been adjusted to the Internet,16 perhaps personal teleporters will have come
into use, and the traditional customs post will seem irrelevant for people as well as for
information. Unanticipated change undermines government’s ability to control liberties.
In place of the menacing picture drawn by the statist ratchet, envisaging a continuous
increase of official power over information and personal conduct, we might imagine
government as a rat on a treadmill, constantly struggling to keep pace with new forms of
technology and new modes of citizen behavior.
2. Institutional mechanisms?
Statist ratchet accounts fail to specify any institutional mechanism by which legal
and political measures intended to combat emergencies become irreversible. Why,
exactly, do temporary measures stick after the emergency has passed? Although statist
ratchet accounts usually gloss over this point, we can imagine several related
mechanisms. First, judicial precedent developed in times of emergency might distend or
spill over into the ordinary legal system, and precedent will be costly to overrule. Second,
legal rules developed in times of emergency may be protected by the status quo bias built
into the legislative system, or by the formation of bureaucracies and interest groups who
coalesce around the new measures and block subsequent efforts to repeal them. We
critique these ideas in turn.
Precedent. The locus classicus for the argument from precedent is Justice
Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. United States, with its famous claim that
15

Pareto improvement is usually defined over utility rather than liberty, but the latter idea is perfectly
coherent. See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 25-26 (1992).
16
Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches, 2001 U. Chi. Legal
F. 103 (2001).

7

once a judicial opinion rationalizes [an emergency] order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that
the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated . . .
[a] principle [that] lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.17
Jackson’s preferred course of action was, not to invalidate the order, but to treat it
as nonjusticiable—a version of the political-question doctrine. Expanding upon (and
modifying) Jackson’s concurrence, commentators such as Gross and Tushnet argue that
“it is better to have emergency powers exercised in an extraconstitutional way, so that
everyone understands that the actions are extraordinary, than to have the actions
rationalized away as consistent with the Constitution and thereby normalized.”18
Jackson’s idea is obscure, and the position commentators have derived from it is
implausible. Suppose that, contra Jackson, judicial precedents explicitly uphold
government actions in a time of crisis on the ground that the emergency justifies the
order, even if a similar order would be invalid in ordinary times. Why must the precedent
both (1) spill over into ordinary law and (2) remain entrenched “for all time,” as Jackson
puts it? As for the first condition, the precedent will itself have a built-in limitation to
emergency circumstances. Presumably the idea is that precedents are extremely
malleable, and the category of “emergency” is a fluid and unstable one. But if this is so it
is so in both directions; later judges may either distend the precedent to accommodate
government power or else contract the precedent to constrain it. Jackson’s exegetes need
to supply an independent account to explain why the former possibility is more likely,
and more harmful, than the latter; and they have not done so.
The best stab at an account of this sort appears in another Jackson opinion.
Institutional incentives will cause the executive to press the boundaries of the
“emergency” category to ever-broader extremes, and that will be possible because the
category of “emergency” is extraordinarily nebulous and difficult to specify through legal
formulations. Cognitive limitations will induce the courts to acquiesce in this expansion.
Because the courts will be aware of the limits of their information and of the high risks of
error if they frustrate executive action in a genuine emergency, they will adopt a
deferential stance.19 This reconstructed argument seems plausible as far as it goes, but
rational judges who are aware of their cognitive limitations—and this account assumes
self-awareness—can anticipate the slippage and forestall it, by initially defining the
category of emergency more narrowly than they otherwise would. The eventual
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expansion of the category will simply reinstate its optimal scope, rather than exceeding
it.20
At bottom, the Jackson view must rest on a simple empirical conjecture: the
expansion of emergency powers, once begun, will inevitably culminate in total executive
domination. But this seems hysterical; there is no evidence for it in the study of
comparative politics. Many constitutions contain explicit provisions for emergency
powers, either in text or in judicial doctrine.21 Sometimes executive domination has
overtaken the relevant polities, sometimes it has not; other variables probably dominate,
such as the nation’s stage of development, or its susceptibility to economic shocks, or the
design of legislative and judicial institutions. Jackson’s exegetes bear the burden of
showing, systematically, that recognizing a legal category of emergency powers
automatically sends the constitution reeling to the bottom of the slippery slope. A casual
citation to a few salient examples, typically the emergency provisions of the Weimar
constitution, will not carry that burden.
As for the second condition, it is hard to see why precedents granting government
emergency powers should be irreversibly entrenched, at least if precedents denying the
government emergency powers are not. Stare decisis will be either strong or weak. If it is
weak, then past precedents granting emergency powers can be overruled, even if they
cannot be cabined to emergency situations. If stare decisis is strong, then courts will be
unable to overrule precedents that previously denied government emergency powers in
particular settings, or that strongly entrenched liberties, as well as precedents that granted
emergency powers. Here too the argument from precedent cuts in both directions. There
is no ratchet mechanism that uniquely applies to precedents upholding government
claims of emergency power; the general stickiness of precedent is a far broader point.
Legislation (and constitutional amendment). The argument from precedent points
to the inertia built into the judicial system; there is a similar argument that points to the
inertia of the lawmaking system, embodied in the costly procedures for statutory
enactment and constitutional amendment. These design features partially entrench the
legal status quo; the statist ratchet account might implicitly suppose that temporary
legislation or constitutional provisions, enacted during emergencies, will thus stick after
the emergency has passed. But rational and well-motivated legislators can anticipate this
by inserting sunset provisions in emergency legislation (as Congress did in the Patriot
Act); rational and well-motivated constitutional drafters can insert sunset provisions in
constitutional rules.22 Gross argues that “[t]ime-bound emergency legislation is often the
subject of future extensions and renewals,”23 and there are current proposals to extend the
Patriot Act or repeal its sunset clause, but the existence of the sunset clause alters the
status quo point: unless proponents of extension can surmount the costly hurdles to
legislative action, the statute will lapse automatically. Thus libertarian opponents of
renewal still enjoy the advantage of legislative inertia.
20
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The statist ratchet account must suppose that legislators either irrationally fail to
anticipate the future termination of the emergency, perhaps because they are gripped by
“panic,” or else that legislators are motivated to use any and every emergency as a means
to expand the permanent powers of government. We address “panic” at length in Part III
below. As for motivations, the idea that legislators desire to maximize permanent state
power as against the individual is vivid, but it lacks microfoundations in the behavior of
the individuals who occupy the legislature. Why, exactly, does it benefit legislators to
expand the powers of government? As individuals, they may or may not benefit; even if
legislators have an individual stake in the power of Congress as an institution, expanding
government power in times of emergency usually benefits the executive most of all, and
the executive is Congress’ principal institutional rival. The statist ratchet fails to offer a
plausible account of legislators’ maximands. We might posit that legislators strictly
maximize their chances of re-election, but then the question just becomes why
constituents demand legislation that (for lack of sunsetting) will outlive the emergency,
and the picture must be that during emergencies constituents irrationally demand
permanent legislation; so we are back to the “panic” idea again.
Even accepting the premise that legislators are frequently irrational or illmotivated, pointing to the status quo bias built into the lawmaking system proves too
much. The status quo bias operates neutrally across different types of statutes and
constitutional provisions. It not only (1) entrenches liberty-restricting laws (the only case
the statist ratchet acknowledges), but equally (2) prevents enactment of liberty-restricting
laws, and (3) entrenches liberty-protecting ones. As for case (2), the high costs of
statutory enactment can weed out the most draconian proposals for controlling sedition
and terrorism; an example is Senator Chamberlin’s 1918 proposal to enact legislation that
would allow government to punish spies by court-martial, which was killed by Wilson’s
opposition.24 As for case (3), the costs of enactment protect from repeal any laws that
protect liberties from infringement by later legislatures or the executive. Consider the
Posse Comitatus Act, which blocks the executive from using regular armed forces for
domestic law enforcement, and thus embodies a traditional libertarian anxiety.25 The Act
is just as entrenched by the lawmaking process as the Patriot Act would be, had Congress
not provided a sunset.
Bureaucracies and interest groups. A related mechanism might posit that
emergency policies generate bureaucracies who block the repeal of those policies. On this
view, creating new agencies to cope with an emergency, perhaps by consolidation of old
agencies (as with the Department of Homeland Security), creates a cadre of officials with
vested interests in prolonging the new bureaucracy for as long as possible, even after the
emergency has petered out. Those officials will use their influence, in Congress and with
client interest groups, to block repeal of the agency’s organic statute or diminution of the
agency’s power.
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It is hardly clear that bureaucratic immortality is a real phenomenon; that sort of
talk had more resonance before Congress abolished the Interstate Commerce
Commission, deregulated the airlines, and reorganized and streamlined the security
agencies. The same problems we have discussed—the underdeveloped account of
officials’ maximands, and the mismatch between the scope of the mechanism and the
scope of the argument—persist here as well. It is unclear why rational legislators would
fail to anticipate and block the future bureaucrats’ strategy by inserting a sunset
termination provision, a periodic review process, or some other device. And if
bureaucratic inertia is a real phenomenon, it operates equally to block moves that would
expand government power, restrict liberty, or permanently institutionalize a state of
emergency. If an inefficient welter of competing security agencies hampers government’s
efforts to extend control over unpopular social groups,26 then those agencies will attempt
to block congressional attempts to reorganize them into a more efficient, and more
menacing, centralized department. If Congress nonetheless succeeds in doing so, as it
recently has, why cannot a future Congress succeed in abolishing or curtailing the agency
created to meet the emergency? The dilemma for the statist ratchet account is that either
bureaucratic inertia is real, in which case it will block liberty-infringing moves as well as
liberty-expanding ones, or it is not real, in which case liberty-infringing moves will not
become entrenched.
Generally speaking, there is no reason to suppose that laws, policies and
bureaucratic institutions created during an emergency (1) systematically fail to change, or
change back, after a crisis has passed (2) because of institutional inertia and interestgroup pressure. World War I produced a large new cadre of regulatory agencies that
persisted into the New Deal and beyond.27 But a plausible view is that the national
economy was previously under-regulated, and that the new institutions satisfied social
demand; so this example does not clearly satisfy condition (2). World War II produced
espionage and treason laws, and institutions like military tribunals, that were later relaxed
and modified, in violation of condition (1) ; why did the statist ratchet not operate there?
These examples are impressionistic, but not more so than the examples adduced by
proponents of the statist ratchet. As we discuss at the end of this Part, the better working
presumption is just that no ratchet effects operate, in any direction; institutional change
displays no consistent trend or mechanism, and is determined differently in different
contexts by a complex mix of political, economic and technological forces.
3. Adaptive preferences?
We will briefly look at the idea that the statist ratchet operates by virtue of a
psychological mechanism. Proponents of the statist ratchet account say, rather vaguely,
that government’s emergency measures have “a tranquilizing effect . . . on the general
public’s critical approach toward emergency regimes.”28 The underlying picture here
must be some sort of endogenous preference formation, which causes social preferences
to conform to government policies, or the related idea of adaptive preferences, in which
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individuals limit their aspirations, not merely their actions, by reference to the set of
feasible policies. Somehow, the intuition runs, society gets used to the post-crisis baseline
of expanded governmental power; the ratchet operates not because temporary emergency
measures block society’s capacity to return to the status quo ante, but because society no
longer desires to do so.
The implicit assumption here is that the post-crisis baseline is bad. If it is good—
if the precrisis baseline represented a society under-prepared for emergencies, in which
law and institutions were supplying too much liberty and not enough order—then the
endogenous formation of preferences for the post-crisis baseline would help to stabilize
the new regime, and would thus be good as well. At the very least we would need a very
strong account (welfarist or nonwelfarist) of the value of autonomous preference
formation to say that the public’s adaptation to the new social state is bad; the statist
ratchet offers no such account. So the preference-based version of the statist ratchet is,
like the institutional version, parasitic on a suppressed and wholly independent judgment
that the status quo ante represents the correct balance between liberty and order; more on
this below.
In fact, however, the evidence that endogenous or adaptive preference formation
operates in this way is scant indeed. As we also discuss below, another view paints just
the opposite picture of political and social psychology: in the post-crisis state, a
widespread revulsion against the prevailing liberty-infringing policies sets in, and society
judges, in hindsight, that the emergency measures were unnecessary. The stock example
is the World War II era internment of Japanese-American citizens, which is now widely
described as an egregious mistake that inflicted unnecessary deprivations of liberty, due
in part to racial animus. If this sort of post hoc revulsion operates consistently, then the
right account would emphasize contrarian preference formation and hindsight bias, rather
than the endogenous preference formation and confirmation bias posited by the statist
ratchet. But we will claim that a third account—no ratchets operate systematically, in
either a liberty-restricting or a liberty-expanding direction—is the most convincing of all.
4. Is the statist ratchet bad?
Normatively, the statist ratchet account simply assumes that the status quo ante—
the legal baseline prior to the emergency that produces an irreversible expansion of state
control—already embodies the optimal balance between liberty and security. So the
statist ratchet in effect makes two normative assertions: (1) the precrisis legal rules were
optimally balanced for the precrisis state; (2) the post-crisis rules are too restrictive for
the post-crisis state.
Yet in some settings either or both of these assertions will fail to hold. We might
deny (2) while affirming (1), if we think both that the precrisis rules were optimal for the
precrisis state and that the post-crisis rules are optimal for the post-crisis state. If, for
example, the crisis is the product of a permanent change in the polity’s political
circumstances, such that the value of security is higher after the crisis than before it, then
the balance should be recalibrated after the crisis; failing to do so would constitute social
paralysis, rather than a laudable respect for traditional liberties.
More interestingly, we might deny both (1) and (2), if we think that before the
emergency society was, in some sense, unprepared for the emergency, underregulated, or
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excessively liberty-protecting, while after the emergency society has attained the optimal
balance. We might believe, for example, that as of September 10, 2001, American
governmental institutions were supplying too much liberty and not enough security.
Well-documented turf battles between uncoordinated, and arguably inefficient, security
and intelligence agencies meant that government failed to anticipate and forestall a major
terrorist attack, or even to plan sensibly for its aftermath.29 On this sort of view, the
institutional puzzle would be to explain why government underreacted to the terrorist
threat—the opposite of the puzzle for the statist ratchet account, which is to explain why
government overreacts to threats. The point here is not to endorse this view of post-9/11
security reorganization, on the merits. But the possibility cannot be assumed away, a
priori.
Proponents of the statist ratchet rarely consider these possibilities. Consider
Dermot Walsh’s argument that the expansion of law-enforcement powers in the Republic
of Ireland, from about 1970 to the present, has created a legal regime in which official
powers to investigate and detain both suspected terrorists and ordinary criminals
systematically trumps civil liberties.30 Walsh’s account suggests that legal rules initially
formulated to cope with terrorist campaigns and other security emergencies bled over into
ordinary policing, resulting in a harsh regime of criminal procedure. Walsh disclaims any
substantive evaluation of these developments, confining himself to the procedural
objection that the developments never received adequate legislative deliberation. Oren
Gross, however, cites Walsh’s history in an argument that emergency powers of the sort
initially granted to Irish officials will produce “insidious changes” by spilling over into
nonemergency settings.31
But nothing in Walsh’s history suggests any reason to condemn, on substantive
civil-libertarian grounds, the result of the developments he describes. Walsh notes that
the initial impetus for expanded law-enforcement authority was “[t]he escalation of
subversive activity associated with Northern Ireland” (although he tendentiously calls this
a “pretext”), and acknowledges that the preexisting law was “so heavily biased in favour
of the freedom of the individual that the task facing the prosecution could be described
fairly as a very tricky obstacle course.”32 So an obvious alternative view is that in Ireland,
circa 1970, the law of criminal procedure was too lax for an increasingly complex and
heterogeneous society—perhaps because the relevant law was initially impressed with the
libertarian mold of 19th-century British procedure, and had never been updated. The
expansion of police powers after 1970, on this view, would just represent a belated
adjustment towards the optimum balance of liberty and security, not a lamentable
departure from that balance.
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In like vein, Gross says that “emergencies have led to quantum leaps” in a process
of “aggrandizement” of executive powers—in America, France, and Great Britain after
the two world wars.33 Aggrandizement is meant to sound bad, but Gross never actually
gives a straightforward normative argument to that effect. It is equally possible that
quantum leaps occurred because war or emergency liberated the polity from some
institutional sclerosis, or entrenched equilibrium, that had held government power at an
inadequately low level. Gross acknowledges that “[t]he growing complexity of modern
society and the needs of its members have played an important role in the expansion of
executive authority”;34 but this may be the whole story, not just part of it.
Why, exactly, is it bad if emergency or temporary measures spill over into the
ordinary legal system? Spillover of this sort is, in itself, neither good nor bad. The only
question is whether the new state of affairs is an improvement on the status quo ante or
not; if it is an improvement, then the spillover was a benign event. Perhaps the war or
emergency stimulated legal experimentation, spurred the development of new
technology, or produced ingenious policy mechanisms; in any of these cases it might be
wise, not foolish, to incorporate the new information or innovation into the ordinary law
after the emergency has passed. The statist ratchet suffers from a virulent strain of the
naturalistic fallacy: whatever complex of legal rules happens to exist, at some status quo
point, is taken to be good, and any shift in the direction of greater security is taken to be
bad. But if the status quo can embody too much liberty, rather than just the right amount,
the picture is arbitrary.
C. The libertarian ratchet
If the statist ratchet identifies a sustained and irreversible decline of civil liberties,
a mirror-image position—the libertarian ratchet—identifies a progressive and optimistic
trend. In this camp are Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim to discern a “generally
ameliorative trend” in government’s treatment of civil liberties during wartime;35 an
argument by Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein, that social evaluation, in hindsight, of
government performance during wars and other crises produces a “trend toward greater
protection for civil liberties in wartime”;36 and a similar argument by Mark Tushnet.37 Of
these, Rehnquist and Tushnet seem to view the libertarian ratchet as good, while
Goldsmith and Sunstein focus on explanation rather than normative assessment. Many of
the preceding objections to the statist ratchet apply equally against the libertarian ratchet,
mutatis mutandis; we will confine ourselves to a few additional points.
The first is that the libertarian ratchet, like the statist ratchet, extrapolates a trend
from an impoverished data set containing too few observations. Proponents of the
libertarian ratchet have little to work with: the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the armed
conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, perhaps the red scares of the 1950s if “war” is defined
capaciously. Many curves can be drawn through such a small set of points.
Goldsmith and Sunstein claim that
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compared to past wars led by Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, the Bush
administration has diminished relatively few civil liberties. Even a conservative
Executive branch, it seems, is influenced by the general trend towards civil
liberty protections during wartime.38
Although the first point is indisputable—the Bush administration has not
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, punished harmless dissenters, or interned large
numbers of American citizens—the second point does not follow from the first, and is
methodologically infirm. To know whether the Bush administration would behave with
greater respect for civil liberties than the administrations of Lincoln, Wilson, or
Roosevelt, we would have to observe similar conditions; and we do not. Would the Bush
administration show as much restraint if enemy troops were within a short train ride of
Washington (Lincoln), if Europe exploded in armed struggle (Wilson), or if an American
fleet had been wiped out by the surprise attack of a foreign state (Roosevelt)? It is not
hard to imagine, even today, that civil liberties would be extensively abridged in such
circumstances. These are counterfactual speculations, but the libertarian ratchet itself
rests on a counterfactual speculation—that current administrations would behave with
more restraint than past ones, given like conditions.
The general claim is that a series of wars39 produce an ever-greater respect for
civil liberties, but it is hardly obvious that the independent variable and the dependent
one are correlated, let alone causally linked. In many countries, casual empiricism
suggests that a series of wars and crises have not produced ever-increasing respect for
civil liberties; consider the history of Prussia, and Germany as a whole, between 1871
and 1945. And in other countries civil liberties have increased over time periods when no
wars occurred; Europe after World War II is a large example. In the European case, and
in other cases, national wealth is a major confounding variable, one that Goldsmith and
Sunstein say little about. A plausible hypothesis is that wealthier countries, whatever their
military history, show greater respect for civil liberties than poor ones do.
To establish the libertarian ratchet a much larger comparative study would be
necessary; confining the inquiry to one nation (America) and a few wars tells us little.
This is so even if there has been a constantly increasing respect for civil liberties in
America. To generate the general claim solely from the American case is to commit the
methodological mistake of selecting cases on the dependent variable.40 The claim that
spring will come early whenever the groundhog sees his shadow cannot be proved by
looking solely at years in which, in fact, spring came early.
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Perhaps we should understand the libertarian ratchet not as advancing a fullyspecified hypothesis of this sort, but simply as describing a causal mechanism that
operates ceteris paribus: after a series of wars, hindsight tends to produce social
judgments that past suspensions of civil liberties were unnecessary. But our second point
is that the hindsight-bias mechanism is underspecified; the level of generality at which
hindsight operates makes a critical difference. Goldsmith and Sunstein seem to assume
that the hindsight judgment operates to bar “unnecessary future invasions of civil
liberties,” as a general class, but it may equally be true that hindsight condemns only the
specific policies or programs instituted in past crises. New policies or programs will be
categorized differently in the social cognition, and will be assessed strictly ex ante. As
Tushnet puts it (in acknowledged tension with his own argument):
Judges and scholars develop doctrines and approaches that preclude the
repetition of the last generation’s mistakes. Unfortunately, each new threat
generates new policy responses, which are—almost by definition—not
precluded by the doctrines designed to make it impossible to adopt the policies
used last time. And yet, the next generation again concludes that the new policy
responses were mistaken. We learn from our mistakes to the extent that we do
not repeat precisely the same errors, but it seems that we do not learn enough to
keep us from making new and different mistakes.
This is a version of the conceptual point we advanced against the statist ratchet:
because the policy space changes over time, it is simplistic to ask whether wars or other
emergencies cause an “increase” or “decrease” in governmental respect for civil liberties.
As old forms of governmental control become disreputable and disappear (suspension of
judicial process, suppression of political speech, and internment), new forms become
technologically feasible and normatively freighted (consider sophisticated government
monitoring of private communications, including internet use, or of lawyers’
conversations with clients). Here again, there just is no single dimension of greater or
lesser respect for civil liberties—and thus no predicate for the unidirectional trend-line
that both the libertarian and statist ratchets assume.
D. Government without ratchets
The last point emphasizes the common premise of the libertarian and statist
ratchets: both accounts assume that the history of civil liberties in America show a
constant trend, or at least that war and other emergencies have a constant, unidirectional
ratchet effect on civil liberties. The two accounts simply disagree about whether the
direction of the trend is good or bad.
We favor a third view: there just are no systematic trends in the history of civil
liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or emergencies
to push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained fashion. Wars, crises
and emergencies come in a range of shapes and sizes; the categories themselves are just
methodological conveniences, dichotomous cuts in continuous phenomena. It is unclear,
given the current state of the empirical work, whether wars and emergencies have any
effect on civil liberties; if they do, the effects may be complex and multiple, not simple
and unidirectional. Especially absent is any convincing reason to think that any political,
social or psychological ratchet operates, under which wars and emergencies have
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irreversible effects on future policies. The empirical evidence for ratchets in either good
or bad directions is absent,41 and the mechanisms said to create a ratchet are implausible
or underspecified.
As a working presumption, then, we should approach each new social state—
whether labeled war, emergency, or anything else—without worrying or hoping that our
present choices will have systematic and irreversible effects on the choices made by
future generations in unforeseeable future emergencies. The better question is just
whether, given the circumstances as we know them to be at present, the policies that
government pursues are good ones, in light of whatever substantive theory of rights we
hold, and in light of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. This
formulation is deliberately banal. What it rejects is any attempt to structure the inquiry
into the merits of particular policies by worrying about the precedential effects of current
policies, or in some other way speculating on the irreversible system-level effects of
those policies, over time, on future emergencies that future versions of our own society
will face. That additional question is a strange attempt, as it were, to get beyond or
outside our own historical circumstances; and there is no reason to think that there are
any such effects anyway.
III. Fear
In this Part we criticize accounts of emergency that emphasize the Constitution’s
role in limiting the impact of fear on government policy. The panic thesis argues that
because fear causes decisionmakers to exaggerate threats and neglect civil liberties and
similar values, expanding decisionmakers’ constitutional powers will result in bad policy.
Any gains to national security would be minimal, and the losses to civil liberties would
be great. Thus, enforcing the Constitution to the same extent as during periods of
normalcy would protect civil liberties at little cost.
We argue that the panic thesis is wrong, and does not support the
antiaccommodation position. We make three points. First, fear does not play an
unambiguously negative role in decisionmaking. Against the standard view that fear
interferes with decisionmaking, we argue that fear has both cognitive and motivational
benefits. Second, even if fear did play a negative role, it is doubtful that fear, so
understood, has much influence on policy during emergencies, or that it has more
influence on policy during emergencies than it does during non-emergencies. Third, even
if fear did play a negative role in decisionmaking, and played a greater such role during
emergencies than during non-emergencies, it is doubtful that these bad effects can be
avoided through the enforcement of the Constitution or other institutional devices, at
acceptable cost to national security. All three of these points, individually and in the
aggregate, suggest that strict enforcement of the Constitution during emergencies will not
improve policy choices by restricting the influence of fear.
A. Preliminaries
Fear can influence government action in two ways. First, government officials
might feel fear. Second, even if government officials do not feel fear, the public might
41

This has been frequently noted; see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 304
(2003).

17

feel fear, and government officials might feel compelled to act on the public’s fears, lest
they be turned out of office for being insufficiently responsive to the public’s concerns.
In the second case, it is a useful simplification to assume that government officials, by
acting as honest agents, act as if they were themselves afraid; thus, the two cases can be
treated as though they were the same. In Section D, we consider the case where only the
public feels fear and government officials are insulated from popular pressure.
To understand how fearful government officials might make decisions, one can
profitably begin by considering the rational actor model as a baseline. The rational actor
model assumes that people implicitly use accurate probability distributions to estimate
the likelihood of uncertain outcomes. The methodological assumption is obviously
strong; the justification is that errors are symmetrical and wash out, so that aggregate
behavior obeys accurate probability distributions at a statistically significant level even if
individual behavior deviates in both directions. If this assumption is true, then
governments act as rationally during emergencies as during normal times. The decision to
infringe civil liberties for security purpose may be right or wrong, but it is no more likely
right or wrong than the quotidian decision to construct a new highway or reduce funding
for education. There is no reason to think that the government will systematically
undervalue civil liberties or overvalue security during emergencies, or that it will
systematically overestimate the magnitude of a threat, compared to its behavior during
non-emergencies. Instead, the government will attach the same weights to these goods as
it does during non-emergencies; it will also on average accurately estimate the magnitude
of the threat, sometimes underestimating it and at other times overestimating it.
The rational actor model does not clearly support either the accommodation
position or the strict enforcement position. The critic of accommodation can argue that a
rational executive will disregard civil liberties the same during emergencies as during
non-emergencies; therefore, constitutional enforcement should be the same as well.
Courts can protect civil liberties while permitting emergency measures by requiring that
the government show that infringements on civil liberties serve the compelling interest in
national security. The defense of accommodation rests not on the rational actor model,
but on an empirical assumption about relative institutional competence: courts are in a
bad position to evaluate the executive’s emergency measures. Secrecy is more important
than during non-emergencies; so is speed, vigor, and enthusiasm. The standard
characteristics of judicial review—deliberation, openness, independence, distance,
slowness—may be minor costs, and sometimes virtues, during peacetime; but during
emergencies they are intolerable.
The panic thesis argues that the problem with emergency measures is not that they
may be rational but objectionable infringements on civil liberties but that they are
frequently irrational, and thus infringe civil liberties without also creating sufficient
national security benefits. During emergencies, panic interferes with rational assessment
of risks. The distortion can take a number of forms: exaggeration of the probability or
magnitude of the threatened harm; or, what amounts to nearly the same thing, neglect of
competing values such as privacy and equality. As a result, government interests will not
usually be as compelling as everyone thinks they are, and government policy, if not
constrained, will unnecessarily interfere with civil liberties. Although this argument is
conventionally advanced by civil libertarians concerned by wartime restrictions, it also
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underlies a popular view about the effectiveness of terrorism: that it “trap[s] the
authorities into brutal repression and overreaction which then alienates the public and
drives them into tacit or active collaboration with the terrorists.”42 The claim is not that
the government rationally curtails civil liberties in order to combat the terrorist threat, but
that the government overreacts, and that the public tolerates a rational response but not an
overreaction. The source of overreaction could only be fear or some other emotion such
as anger or outrage.43 On this view, strict enforcement of the Constitution has two virtues:
preservation of civil liberties, a good in itself, and preservation of the government against
its own bad judgment.
This argument, at base, holds that the government’s policy will not reflect
accurate probability distributions, or else that a rational government will take advantage
of the public’s inaccurate probability distributions so that it can accomplish ends denied
to it during non-emergencies. Fear displaces rational assessment of the risks at one level
or the other. Is this view accurate?
B. Two Views of Fear
The antiaccommodation view depends heavily on a particular theory of fear, a
theory that implies that fear interferes with cognition and judgment. However, fear is a
complex emotion, and generalizing about its relationship to cognition is hazardous.
The simple view of fear underlying the antiaccommodation theory springs from
one aspect of this emotion, its core noncognitive basis.44 Fear is in part a purely
physiological response to a threat, a response that is outside of conscious control. When a
person comes upon a tiger in a jungle, he undergoes certain physiological changes—the
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chemistry of his blood changes, his heartbeat increases, certain areas of his brain are
stimulated—that result in an urge to flee that can be overcome only with difficulty. One
interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that panic responses appear to be asymmetrically
distributed: false positives are more likely than false negatives. A person is more likely to
flee from a shadow that looks like a tiger than to fail to run from a tiger that looks like a
shadow.45 Evolutionary psychologists argue that the asymmetry of responses is the result
of an asymmetry in the payoffs. A person who is eaten by a tiger is worse off than a
person who unnecessarily runs away from a shadow. Thus, the noncognitive aspect of
fear has two immediate implications: that people do not think about threats and react to
them “rationally”; and that the automatic reaction to threats reflects long gone
evolutionary pressures rather than the needs of an agent in modern society.
This story yields two opposing approaches to the role of fear in decisionmaking.
The first view is that fear interferes with cognition: the person who feels fear reacts to the
threat instinctively rather than deliberatively, and in a way that is biased rather than
neutral. Fear of air travel causes people to drive, which is riskier; fear of pesticides, toxic
waste, and genetic engineering causes people to endorse expensive and ineffective
policies that cause more harm than good.46 This fear-interferes-with-cognition view has
deep roots in the Western philosophical tradition, one piece of which rests on the
opposition of reason and passion.47 Passions interfere with reason, and the rational person
attempts to suppress them. When a person is motivated by a passion, it means that his
choices are unlikely to be good ones.
The second view is that fear does not interfere with cognition, or if it does, the
interference contributes to good action.48 There are two related points here. First, fear
enhances the senses: the person who feels fear is attuned to the threat, and alert to every
nuance of the environment. Fear powers a searchlight that highlights some features of the
landscape even as it obscures others. Second, fear provides motivation. Where a fully
rational person spends time deliberating, the fearful person acts quickly. Both of these
factors suggest that fear can play a constructive role during national emergencies.
How does fear enhance the senses? Although the fearful person may make the
characteristic mistake of seeing a tiger in a shadow, the other side of this error is the
sensory arousal that allows the person to pick out in the environment threats that would
otherwise be invisible. It has been said that after 9/11, airplane passengers and security
officials paid much more attention to other passengers, and were more ready to alert
authorities or intervene personally if they saw something suspicious. This alertness
resulted in many false positives: conversations were misinterpreted, conclusions were
drawn from swarthy complexions, harmless objects were confiscated as weapons. But in
a few cases, hijackings or bombings were prevented. Do the lives saved justify the
inconvenience to all passengers and Arabs and Muslims in particular? Civil libertarians
might say yes or no, but one’s position on this question is not the issue. What recent
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experience has shown is that fear has generated cognitive gains as well as losses, and part
of the reason is that the asymmetry between gains and losses that underlie the
evolutionary story may apply to a world threatened by terrorism as well, however
imperfectly. The simple story—that fear means error—is too simple.
The motivational benefit of fear for individuals is that it enables a rapid response
to a possible threat that, if real, would not give individuals time to deliberate about
available options. To the drafter of a rule that constrains the curtailment of civil liberties,
or to the judge who seeks to enforce that rule or the general antiaccommodation position,
the decisionmaker always has a powerful argument: “your rational assessments—even if
they are not clouded by your remoteness from the current emergency—may have resulted
from a kind of clear thinking but are fatally undermined by your motivational remoteness.
If you did not feel fear, then you cannot have put in the necessary effort to make the right
decision.” Fear compels people to devote time, effort, and resources to solving a problem
that for a dispassionate and uninvolved person may be interesting but is not compelling.
In this way, fear motivates not only action, but deliberation. Having perceived a threat,
and felt fear, people will work hard to think of ways to address it. They are more likely to
discard old assumptions and complacent ways of thinking, and to address problems with
new vigor.
The second, complex view of fear does not deny the insights of the first view; it
incorporates them into more nuanced account. Fear will produce choices that are different
from those that will be made by a person who does not feel fear, but these choices may be
better or worse, depending on context. The argument here mirrors an increasingly
influential psychological and philosophical literature on the passions, a literature that
stress the constructive role of the passions in judgment.49 “Emotions provide the animal
[including the human] with a sense of how the world relates to its own set of goals and
projects. Without that sense, decision making and action are derailed.”50 Disgust involves
a form of magical thinking that causes people to avoid objects or persons who are
harmless; but it also reflects moral judgments and motivates condemnation of morally
offensive behavior.51 Anger can magnify slights and provoke unreasoned violence; but it
is also a response to an offense against one’s dignity and can motivate legitimate
protest.52 The passions do not always inhibit reason; they also inform reason and provide
the motivation for necessary action.
Against the view that panicked government officials overreact to an emergency,
and unnecessarily curtail civil liberties, we suggest a more constructive theory of the role
of fear. Before the emergency, government officials are complacent. They do not think
clearly or vigorously about the potential threats faced by the nation. After the terrorist
attack or military intervention, their complacency is replaced by fear. Fear stimulates
them to action. Action may be based on good decisions or bad: fear might cause officials
to exaggerate future threats, but it also might arouse them to threats that they would
otherwise not perceive. It is impossible to say in the abstract whether decisions and
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actions provoked by fear are likely to be better than decisions and actions made in a state
of calm. But our limited point is that there is no reason to think that the fear-inspired
decisions are likely to be worse. For that reason, the existence of fear during emergencies
does not support the antiaccommodation theory that the Constitution should be enforced
as strictly during emergencies as during non-emergencies.
C. The Influence of Fear during Emergencies
Suppose now that the simple view of fear is correct, and that it is an
unambiguously negative influence on government decisionmaking. Critics of
accommodation argue that this negative influence of fear justifies skepticism about
emergency policies and strict enforcement of the Constitution. However, this argument is
implausible. It is doubtful that fear, so understood, has more influence on decisionmaking
during emergencies than decisionmaking during non-emergencies.
The panic thesis, implicit in much scholarship though rarely discussed in detail,
holds that citizens and officials respond to terrorism and war in the same way that an
individual in the jungle responds to a tiger or snake. The national response to emergency,
because it is a standard fear response, is characterized by the same circumvention of
ordinary deliberative processes: thus, (i) the response is instinctive rather than reasoned,
and thus subject to error; and (ii) the error will be biased in the direction of overreaction.
While the flight reaction was a good evolutionary strategy on the savannah, in a complex
modern society the flight response is not suitable and can only interfere with judgment.
Its advantage—speed—has minimal value for social decisionmaking. No national
emergency requires an immediate reaction—except by trained professionals who execute
policies established earlier—but instead over days, months, or years people make
complex judgments about the appropriate institutional response. And the asymmetrical
nature of fear guarantees that people will, during a national emergency, overweight the
threat and underweight other things that people value, such as civil liberties.
But if decisionmakers rarely act immediately, then the tiger story cannot bear the
metaphoric weight that is placed on it. Indeed, the flight response has nothing to do with
the political response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the attack on September 11. The
people who were there—the citizens and soldiers beneath the bombs, the office workers
in the World Trade Center—no doubt felt fear, and most of them probably responded in
the classic way. They experienced the standard physiological effects, and (with the
exception of trained soldiers and security officials) fled without stopping to think. It is
also true that in the days and weeks after the attacks, many people felt fear, although not
the sort that produces a irresistible urge to flee. But this kind of fear is not the kind in
which cognition shuts down. (Some people did have more severe mental reactions and,
for example, shut themselves in their houses, but these reactions were rare.) The fear is
probably better described as a general anxiety or jumpiness, an anxiety that was probably
shared by government officials as well as ordinary citizens.53
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While, as we have noted, there is psychological research suggesting that normal
cognition partly shuts down in response to an immediate threat, we are aware of no
research suggesting that people who feel anxious about a non-immediate threat are
incapable of thinking, or thinking properly, or systematically overweight the threat
relative to other values. Indeed, it would be surprising to find research that clearly
distinguished “anxious thinking” and “calm thinking,” given that anxiety is a pervasive
aspect of life. People are anxious about their children; about their health; about their job
prospects; about their vacation arrangements; about walking home at night. No one
argues that people’s anxiety about their health causes them to take too many
precautions—to get too much exercise, to diet too aggressively, to go to the doctor too
frequently—and to undervalue other things like leisure. So it is hard to see why anxiety
about more remote threats, from terrorists or unfriendly countries with nuclear weapons,
should cause the public, or elected officials, to place more emphasis on security than is
justified, and to sacrifice civil liberties.
Fear generated by immediate threats, then, causes instinctive responses that are
not rational in the cognitive sense, not always desirable, and not a good basis for public
policy, but it is not this kind of fear that leads to restrictions of civil liberties during
wartime. The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II may have been due
to racial animus, or to a mistaken assessment of the risks; it was not the direct result of
panic; indeed there was a delay of weeks before the policy was seriously considered.54
Post-9/11 curtailments of civil liberties, aside from immediate detentions, came after a
significant delay and much deliberation. The civil libertarians’ argument that fear
produces bad policy trades on the ambiguity of the word “panic,” which refers both to
real fear that undermines rationality, and to collectively harmful outcomes that are driven
by rational decisions, such as a bank run, where it is rational for all depositors to
withdraw funds if they believe that enough other depositors are withdrawing funds. Once
we eliminate the false concern about fear, it becomes clear that the panic thesis is
indistinguishable from the argument that during an emergency people are likely to make
mistakes. But if the only concern is that during emergencies people make mistakes, there
would be no reason for demanding that the constitution be enforced normally during
emergencies. Political errors occur during emergencies and nonemergencies, but the
stakes are higher during emergencies, and that is the conventional reason why
constitutional constraints should be relaxed.
In sum, the panic thesis envisions decisionmakers acting immediately when in
fact government policymaking moves slowly even during emergencies. Government is
organized so that general policy decisions about responses to emergencies are made in
advance, and the implementation of policy during an emergency is trusted to security
officials who have been trained to resist the impulse to panic. The notion of fear causing
an irresistible urge to flee is a bad metaphor for an undeniable truth: that during an
emergency the government does not have as much time as it usually does, and as a result
will make more errors than it usually does. But these errors will be driven by normal
cognitive limitations, and not the pressure of fear: thus, the errors will be normally
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distributed. It is as likely that the government will curtail civil liberties too little as too
much.
D. Institutional Problems
Having registered our skepticism that citizens and officials are less capable of
judgment during emergencies than during normal times, we now consider the panic thesis
on its own terms, and assume for the sake of argument that people predictably panic
during national emergencies while remaining calm at other times, and that the panic has
unambiguously negative consequences for decisionmaking. Recall the panic thesis—that
because of the danger of panic, constitutional constraints should not be relaxed during
emergencies. Higher stakes do not justify relaxation of constitutional constraints because
with the higher stakes comes the danger of panic, and constitutional constraints are
needed to prevent fear from generating bad political outcomes such as unnecessary
restriction of civil liberties.
We now examine the question how those constitutional constraints could be
enforced. The antiaccommodation view—that the Constitution be enforced as strictly
during an emergency as during a non-emergency—depends on citizens, executive
officials, or judges having the ability to enforce the Constitution strictly despite their own
fear-addled judgment that a policy is justified by a threat to security. Is this assumption
realistic? How can a person bind himself against his own bad judgment? We examine
three mechanisms: (i) intrapersonal self-restraint; (ii) reliance on rules; and (iii) insulation
of decisionmakers. Each mechanism specifies a different tradeoff between discretion,
which results in cognitive errors, and constraint, which prevents needed action. None
provides reason for endorsing the panic thesis.
1. Intrapersonal Self-Restraint
The panic theory, which assumes that fearful officials make worse judgments than
calm officials, is not the same as the antiaccommodation view. The panic theory is just
one rationale; the ratchet theory, as we saw, is another. Indeed, the panic theory is
broader than the antiaccommodation view: it holds that officials in a state of fear should
always discount their own risk assessments, whereas the antiaccommodation view refers
to one particular circumstance, that of emergency. We might therefore ask, if the panic
justification for the antiaccommodation view is correct, why not constrain policy choices
whenever officials are panicked, not just when there is an emergency; and give calm
officials free rein, even if there is an emergency. Officials could be made to understand
that whenever they feel fear, they are likely to discount civil liberties and exaggerate the
threat.55 When they know themselves to be afraid, they should engage in a kind of
intrapersonal overcompensation, and assume that their own estimate of the threat is too
high. Having pushed down a risk assessment that they know to be high, they can make a
rational decision even when afraid.
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This “panic rule,” as we will call it—discount your own estimate of a threat if you
feel fear—captures the panic theory more precisely than the antiaccommodation view
does. The panic rule is, in legal parlance, a standard: its contours are those of the
underlying normative goal, that of preventing fear from interfering with decisionmaking.
Thus, the panic rule tells officials to discount their risk assessments if and only if they
feel fear. The accommodation position is a rule: it tells officials to discount their risk
assessments if and only if there is an emergency. The fact of emergency serves as a proxy
for the normative concern, that of fear.
The benefit of the panic rule is that it allows the Constitution to accommodate
calm officials, and requires strict enforcement only against those who panic. The problem
is its psychological unrealism. To see this problem, suppose that third party enforcement
of the Constitution is not feasible: the officials who determine policy or law in a state of
fear are the same as the officials charged with enforcing or respecting the Constitution.
Executives who know that judges will defer to their foreign policy are nonetheless
expected to obey the Constitution. And judges themselves may feel fear to the same
degree as the decisionmakers whose laws are being reviewed in court. The panic rule
asks these officials to discount their own threat assessments whenever they feel fear.
The problem with this rule is that it assumes that decisionmakers can accurately
determine the conditions under which they should not trust their own judgment. Suppose
that some event such as a terrorist attack occurs, and then the question facing
decisionmakers is whether to use ethnic profiling in order to prevent further attacks. If, as
we must assume, the decisionmakers are afraid, then they will overestimate the
probability of another terrorist attack, and thus be more likely to infringe civil liberties
than they would if they were calm. Self-restraint could occur only if decisionmakers
could also realize that they overestimate the risk because they afraid. But this is
psychologically unrealistic: either decisionmakers are afraid and exaggerate the risk, or
are not afraid and assess the risk accurately or with normal, unbiased error.56
The contrary view would have one think that officials could both believe that a
threat exists and, knowing that they are afraid, doubt their own belief. But if officials take
the existence of fear as an indication that they should discount their own beliefs, then
why should they credit the belief that there is a threat in the first place?57 People feel fear
because they perceive a threat; they cannot step outside of themselves and doubt their
own beliefs just because they know that fear can interfere with cognition.
2. Rules
The psychological unrealism of the panic rule might be avoided through the use
of a more rule-like rule, one that does not require a decisionmaker to hold incompatible
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beliefs. People have foresight and can design rules and institutions that will dampen the
influence of panic on political outcomes. People might be able to design a rule that
provides that when some event associated with a panic occurs, people should be cautious
about passing laws or endorsing other political actions. The mechanism involves a
distinction between the identification of conditions that can be accurately perceived and
acted upon even when the subject is emotionally aroused, and the exercise of judgment
that the emotional state precludes. People would, even in their fear-clouded minds,
realize that they are afraid because a significant event has occurred, and thus that they
should discount their own judgments or at least delay acting on them.
The condition or proxy could be an emergency described in relatively clear terms:
an invasion or attack by foreign soldiers, a natural disaster, a spike in the death rate, a
decline in the GDP. When these events occur, people could—in a Pavlovian fashion?—
feel themselves committed to discounting their own assessments of risk. The rule might
say that after a terrorist attack, one should divide one’s updated probability assessments
by two. If people think that a subsequent attack is certain, they should discount that to 50
percent; if they think the second attack will kill millions, they should cut the estimate in
half. As a result, people will be less willing to permit police to single out Arabs or
Muslims for suspicion, shut down the airports, and eavesdrop on the mails.
The argument depends on several assumptions, all of them troublesome. First, it
must be the case that people can, while panicking, accurately identify the conditions
under which they panic: that is, they must be able to determine that their current
probability estimates are made under the relevant conditions, and not independently of
these conditions. People must think, “because there was a terrorist attack six months ago,
my current predictions are inaccurate;” and not “the terrorist attack occurred long enough
ago for me to recover my cognitive abilities.” Second, the conditions must actually be
correlated with panic. If the rule is “discount one’s assessment of the risks if a terrorist
attack occurred within two (four?, ten?) years,” then it must be the case that people’s
assessments are exaggerated within that time frame, and to a sufficient extent, and not
reasonably accurate in a substantial portion of the cases. Third, the conditions must be
capable of being specified in advance with reasonable accuracy, and must in fact generate
more benefits than costs. People must be able to know what kind of events are likely to
generate fear and thus interfere with probability estimates, as well as the time frame
during which the effect lasts: airplane crashes, terrorist attacks, military interventions,
and the like, all with their own associated time frames. If the conditions are misspecified,
then the rule will result in people discounting their own beliefs when they are accurate,
and thus failing to deliver an adequate response to an authentic emergency. But because
we have so little information about how people exaggerate risks when afraid, and how
much of a discount is appropriate, it is hard to believe that any rule would improve
behavior.
Critics of accommodation do not typically argue that detailed rules such as these
should be institutionalized. Instead, they attempt to evade the difficult calculus illustrated
by the discussion so far by flatly asserting that, whatever the optimal rule, emergency
policies will be better if they comply with normal constitutional restrictions than if they
do not.
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There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it does not fully
escape the psychological unrealism of intrapersonal self-restraint. People in the grip of
fear will rationalize their decisions on the basis of their exaggerated assessment of the
threat. Because the threat is significant, they will think, a compelling government interest
justifies intrusions on civil liberties. Although it is possible that they choose less
restrictive laws than they would under the accommodation view, we doubt that officials
in the grip of fear are capable of making such fine distinctions. Fear, according to the
simple view endorsed by the panic thesis, focuses attention on the threat and away from
civil liberties. Officials will reach for any policy that addresses the threat, and are likely
to find a compelling government interest in the fact of the emergency. This is the lesson
of history. One can say in favor of the antiaccommodation rule that it is, with respect to
psychological realism, superior to intrapersonal self-restraint. Intrapersonal self-restraint
requires people to discount their own judgments, whereas the antiaccommodation rule
appears to tell them to act the same during emergencies as otherwise. But it is not much
of an improvement.
The second objection is even more important. Like all rules, the
antiaccommodation view reduces decision costs through overinclusion. The
antiaccommodation rule applies to officials who remain calm despite the emergency, and
prevents them from implementing rational policies. It also applies to fearful officials
whose policies might be based on exaggerated notions of risk but still be better policies
than those available under the Constitution strictly construed. A policy of detaining
immigrants, for example, may be based on an exaggerated notion of the threat, but still be
preferable to no policy at all. If unconstrained officials choose policies that are biased
against civil liberties, it remains unlikely that enforcing the Constitution rather than
making accommodations, will ensure that policies that reflect the optimal balancing of
liberty and security will be chosen.
The panic rule and the antiaccommodation rule reflect different tradeoffs between
discretion and overinclusion but neither is satisfactory. The antiaccommodation rule does
not, in the end, escape the charge of psychological unrealism. Both rules require people
to act as if they did not believe their own judgments—the first, by recognizing that fear
may hamper their judgments; the second, by recognizing relatively objective conditions
associated with fear that may hamper their judgments. The first vests too much discretion
in the person who, by hypothesis, cannot trust his own judgment. The second reduces
discretion but then relies on the wholly unsupported claim that the objective conditions
can be identified and specified in advance, and are sufficiently correlated with periods of
public and official fear.
3. Insulation of Decisionmakers
The third mechanism is to vest emotionally disciplined people with political
authority and insulate them from popular opinion. Emotionally disciplined people are less
likely to panic than normal people are, and thus more likely to choose good policies if
unconstrained by popular opinion; but they might rationally implement policies
demanded by a panicking citizenry if the alternative is ejection from office. There are two
versions of this argument. One possibility is to reduce popular accountability at all times,
so that political leaders will be insulated when an emergency occurs. The other possibility
is to vest authority in particular individuals when an emergency is identified or declared;
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for example, the president could declare an emergency and the military would then have
temporary police powers.58 Both versions assume that the people with leadership
positions will actually be calmer during an emergency than the public: ordinary
politicians in the first case, and the president (at the point of declaring the emergency)
and military officials (after the emergency is declared) in the second case. Both versions
also assume that the insulation materials cannot be pierced by public sentiment.
These assumptions are all questionable. The U.S. constitution already insulates
political officials from popular pressures to some extent—more so than a direct
democracy, for example—and it is probable that executive officials, who are constantly
exposed to crises large and small, do not panic as frequently as ordinary people do. But
the usual fears about relaxing constitutional protections during emergencies is based on
the assumption that elected officials do panic sometimes; so the fact that they are
insulated already is no comfort. Insulating them further would be perverse: it would make
officials less accountable during non-emergencies so that they would be less likely to be
influenced by panicking citizens during emergencies. But that just means that civil
liberties will be violated more often during times of calm. Civil libertarians don’t want to
reduce civil liberties during times of calm; they want government official to respect
normal constitutional barriers during emergencies. If government officials are not willing
to do that—either because they are panicking or because they need to respond rationally
to a threat—then giving them greater insulation against popular fears will not improve
their decisions.
It also is questionable whether elected officials can resist political pressures when
citizens panic. During World War II, the internment of Japanese-Americans was not
motivated by the threat that they posed to security; it was motivated, in large part, by
concerns about the morale of the majority of citizens in key states like California, who
falsely believed that Japanese-Americans posed a threat to security or else who associated
them with the enemy and therefore did not trust them.59 A large part of dealing with a
national emergency is to calm the fears of citizens. Government’s usual response is to
channel and dam up these fears rather than dismiss them as irrational. If the public
believes that a threat exists, official assurances to the contrary do no good—instead, it is
evidence to the public that the government is unprepared and insufficiently vigorous—
and waving the Constitution at the public will not help when the public believes that the
Constitution itself is being threatened.
Finally, people do not usually choose officials on the basis of their ability to stay
calm during emergencies. There are too many other relevant considerations. Most
politicians are elected on the basis of their ability to deliver the goods during ordinary
times. Although sometimes a politician’s contains indications of emotional discipline, the
latter is not a salient issue in political contests.
What can be said for the insulation method is that it is psychologically realistic. If
calm people can be identified in advance and given positions of authority, then it is not
psychologically unrealistic to assume that they will make rational decisions. Strict
enforcement of the Constitution, then, will ensure that they do not violate civil liberties
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for rational but impermissible reasons, such as political advantage; but the compelling
interest standard will give them the freedom to make proper responses to the emergency.
Along the dimension of psychological realism, then, the insulation method dominates the
other two rules. But the insulation method does much worse on the cost-benefit
dimension. Insulated officials are not democratically responsive. This means that they are
not likely to make good policy choices, and, even more important, that the public will not
trust them with significant power.
Federal judges are highly insulated officials in the American constitutional
system. For this reason, civil libertarians argue that judges are well positioned to guard
civil liberties against the excesses of panic during wartime and other emergency periods.
Yet judges themselves do not appear to share this view. American judges have almost
always deferred to the executive during emergencies. The reason is apparently that the
judges have done the cost-benefit balancing that the civil libertarians have neglected, and
found themselves wanting.60 If insulation gives them the advantage of calm, the price is
lack of information and lack of power.61 Judges do not have the information that
executives have, and are reluctant to second guess them.62 They also do not have access
to the levers of power, so can only delay a response to emergency by entertaining legal
objections to it. They do not have such access because such power cannot be given to
people who are not politically accountable. All of this explains why during emergencies
judges rarely feel that they have their ordinary peacetime authority to interfere with
executive decisionmaking.
Indeed, the champions of civil liberties during emergencies in American history
have usually been officials in the executive or legislative branches, not the justices of the
supreme court. During the Palmer raids, the attorney general’s attempt to exploit public
fears for political gain was resisted by the acting secretary of labor, whose approval was
needed for deportations.63 The labor department, unlike the supreme court, had the
political power to block or delay deportations because it had the legitimacy conferred by
its expertise about, and authority over, the regulation of immigration. During World War
II, many members of the Roosevelt administration opposed the internment of JapaneseAmericans, and though they could not prevent the military’s decision, they ensured that
the interment would be carried out in as humane a fashion as possible.64 During the Cold
War, although neither Truman nor Eisenhower took brave public stands against
McCarthy, they criticized his methods and tried to undermine his influence, and he was
eventually defeated by opposition from high level appointees in the executive branch and
elected officials in the legislative branch. The supreme court was, throughout these
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events, largely passive. It did not have the political authority to oppose the executive (or
legislative) branch during emergencies, and so it did not act. The justices could not have
made the case that they understood the nature of the emergency better than executive
officials did. Only officials within the executive branch, who could make a credible case
that they had better information and motives than the opponents of civil liberties, and had
the proper institutional responsibility for handling the emergency, had the necessary
public legitimacy.
E. AntiAccommodation as a Precommitment Device
The antiaccommodation view relies on a simple and much criticized theory that
constitutional or other rules can be properly thought of as rational (good)
precommitments against emotional (bad) decisions. The old analogy is to Ulysses being
tied to the mast so that he would not yield to the songs of the sirens. But the analogy is
false, as a recent literature has emphasized.65 Because the sirens were both irresistible and
unambiguously bad, prior commitment to stay on the ship was an unambiguously good
choice. In addition, Ulysses could trust his crew. Fear, though, plays a valuable role as
well as negative role; and no commitment device can be designed in advance that can
prevent fear from influencing behavior, nor is there reason to think that such a device
would produce good outcomes. It is simply perverse for a state to commit itself not to
respond vigorously to emergencies, and we have argued that fear may be an angel rather
than a demon. A purely rational response to a crisis sounds good in the abstract, but some
motivational oomph is necessary as well, and when fear is needed to supply that
motivation, constitutional restrictions on its influence can do much harm.
Legal scholars dwell on the many historical events in which fear appeared to
produce bad policy choices. These are the Red Scares, the Banking Panics, and so forth.
Fears about Hitler may have resulted in appeasement rather than resistance. But there are
as many cases where the absence of fear may have resulted in policies that were weak
when they should have been vigorous. Here we count the failed Weimar government
before Hitler66 and the Kerensky government before Lenin. Conventional wisdom blames
unpreparedness for the 9/11 attacks not on lack of information but on bureaucratic inertia.
Leading officials assessed the risks correctly but could not summon the necessary
political will. Fear changed this instantly. In the United States before World War II,
public complacency about American security behind two oceans hamstrung public
officials who were better informed. Roosevelt sought to stir up fear so as to motivate the
war effort, by contrast to his effort to suppress fear during the early years of the Great
Depression. His contrary actions just show how fear has both good and bad effects, and
fear that can be disabling in one context may provide needed motivation in another.

65

This appears to be the general conclusion of Elster, who expresses skepticism about the claim that
constitutional constraints can be relied on to counteract popular passions. See Elster, supra note __, at 15761. In this book, Elster repudiates some of his optimism in earlier work; see Jon Elster, Ulysses and the
Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (rev. ed. 1984). See also Jeremy Waldron, Law and
Disagreement (1999).
66
The Weimar government had strong emergency powers, but they were used more against the left than
against the right. See Rossiter, supra note __, at 39-41.

30

Conclusion
Two popular arguments against constitutional accommodation during
emergencies—the ratchet thesis and the panic thesis—are implausible. Critics of
constitutional accommodation during emergencies will have to look elsewhere for a
justification for their view. We have noted in passing that ratchet and panic arguments
have appeared in other contexts, and a natural extension of our paper is examination of
these other arguments. Our analysis of constitutional accommodation suggests that
ratchet and panic arguments have a powerful rhetorical effect but rest on shaky
foundations. The psychological and institutional mechanisms through which ratcheting
occurs are rarely specified or justified. And claims about fear or panic rest on a one-sided
theory of the emotions, a theory that has been rejected by modern psychology
scholarship. Future research should subject all of these claims to greater scrutiny.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Adrian Vermeule
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
avermeul@midway.uchicago.edu
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